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THE DOCTOR REQUIREMENT:
GRISWOLD, PRIVACY, AND AT-HOME
REPRODUCTIVE CARE
Yvonne Lindgren*
INTRODUCTION
Privacy law has traditionally offered greater protection to
activities exercised within the home. This is true in common law
as well as across a broad range of constitutional claims. For
example, common law privacy protection identifies the home as a
location of solitude and repose and is often conceptualized as the
“right to be let alone.”1 Fourth Amendment protections against
search and seizure and the notion of the reasonable expectation
of privacy are enhanced when the defendant is within her or his
home.2 In contrast to other constitutional claims, however, I argue
in this Article that reproductive self-care—care that takes place
outside of the formal healthcare setting—receives less
constitutional protection when exercised in the privacy of the
home.3 Most frequently, restrictions on reproductive self-care in
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law
(2017-2018). J.S.D, LL.M., U.C. Berkeley School of Law; J.D., Hastings College of Law;
B.A., U.C.L.A. I would like to thank the participants in the AALS Annual Meeting in San
Francisco; the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics Health Law Professors
Conference at Saint Louis University Law School; the U.S. Feminist Judgements Project:
Re-Writing the Law, Writing the Future at University of Akron School of Law; the Loyola
University of Chicago School of Law Seventh Annual Constitutional Law Colloquium; the
Seventh Annual Midwest Law and Society Retreat at University of Madison, Wisconsin;
and the Indiana Tech Law School Faculty Scholarship Workshop; as well as Jamie Abrams,
Jill Hasday, Sharona Hoffman, Farah Diaz-Tello, Maya Manian, Melissa Mikesell, and
Barbara Noah for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Thank you also
to the Center on Reproductive Rights and Justice at Berkeley Law and the Self-Induction
Abortion Legal Team for providing invaluable information, resources, and webinar
presentations on medication abortion and its legal implications.
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 195 (1890) (arguing for the recognition in law of the right of privacy which they
described as the “right to be let alone”).
2. See infra at notes 87–94 and accompanying text.
3. I use the term “home” because the home is where medication abortion is most
frequently ingested. See Mitchell D. Creinin & Kristina Gemzell Danielsson, Medical

341

LINDGREN_DRAFT 6.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

342

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

7/11/17 7:00 AM

[Vol. 32:341

the home take the form of what I have termed a “doctor
requirement”: laws that require reproductive care be performed
in a formal healthcare setting, often requiring that a doctor be
physically present. While the doctor requirement is imposed in a
variety of reproductive self-care contexts—including selfinsemination,4 miscarriage management,5 abortion, and home
birth6—this Article will focus specifically on medication abortion.7

Abortion in Early Pregnancy, in MANAGEMENT OF UNINTENDED AND ABNORMAL
PREGNANCY: COMPREHENSIVE ABORTION CARE 114 (Paul et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter
MANAGEMENT OF UNINTENDED PREGNANCY]; Medical Management of First-Trimester
Abortion, 143 AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS PRACTICE BULLETIN:
CLINICAL MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR OBSTETRICIAN-GYNECOLOGISTS 3 (Mar.
2014) [hereinafter ACOG PRACTICE BULLETIN]. However, the critical aspect of the
doctor requirement is that pregnant people are forced into public healthcare settings, and
thereby necessarily out of private spaces of their choosing, whether it be the home or any
other non-clinical setting. For a discussion of how the Court has extended the reach of
zonal privacy beyond the home to include areas possessing the qualities of home, such as
an office, store, hotel room, automobile, or taxicab, see Yvonne Lindgren, Personal
Autonomy: Towards a New Taxonomy of Privacy Law, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 447, 454
n.31 (2010). I use the term home while acknowledging that pregnant people may choose
other non-clinical settings to ingest medication abortion.
4. For example, the Uniform Parentage Act required a doctor’s supervision as a
condition for releasing a sperm donor from the rights and obligations of paternity. While
the doctor requirement was removed from the UPA in 2002, many states retain the doctor
requirement in their statutory schemes. See, e.g., Kansas Parentage Act, KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-2208(f) (2014); Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 538–39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(granting visitation over the mother’s objection based upon a conclusion that a sperm
donor’s paternity rights are invalidated only if the insemination is conducted “under the
supervision of a licensed physician” under state law); MELISSA MURRAY & KRISTIN
LUKER, CASES ON REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE 388 (2015).
5. Several states have recently introduced legislation requiring that all miscarriages
be registered with a healthcare professional. See e.g., Ohio Sub. S.B. 175, 127th General
Assembly (Dec. 2015) (requiring women who suffer a miscarriage to file a form with the
state of Ohio indicating that they suffered a miscarriage and providing for felony charges
punishable with life in prison or death for any “prenatal murder,” including those in which
there was “human involvement”); S.B. 962–098385288, (Va. 2009) (requiring all pregnant
people in Virginia to report miscarriages to police or risk legal penalties, including as much
as a year in jail).
6. See, e.g., Amy F. Cohen, The Midwifery Stalemate and Childbirth Choice:
Recognizing Mothers-to-Be as the Best Late Pregnancy Decisionmakers, 80 IND. L.J. 849,
874 (2005) (discussing the ways that privacy of the home is implicated by midwifery in the
home-birth context); Jennifer J. Tachera, A “Birth Right”: Home Births, Midwives and the
Right to Privacy, 12 PAC. L.J. 97, 103 (1980) (arguing that home birth is an aspect of the
privacy right because it relates to family relationships); Barbara A. McCormick, Note,
Childbearing and Nurse-Midwives: A Woman’s Right To Choose, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 661,
694–95 (1983) (arguing that the constitutional right of privacy protects a woman’s right to
choose the site and method of delivery).
7. Medication abortion involves the use of medication rather than surgery to induce
an abortion. See, e.g., ACOG PRACTICE BULLETIN, supra note 3, at 1.
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It considers a previously unaddressed question:8 Why is the home
treated differently in cases of abortion-related self-care than in
other constitutional moments and what does that difference
reveal about this type of regulation? I conclude that laws imposing
a doctor requirement are unconstitutional because medication
abortion at home falls within privacy law’s traditional protection
of spatial, relational, and decisional privacy.9 I conclude that the
doctor requirement reveals that rather than a realm of privacy,
the home has become a site of increasing regulation of pregnant
people’s reproductive autonomy in the guise of benign medical
protectionism.
The anomalous treatment in law of reproductive self-care at
home, when compared with the law’s treatment of other types of
constitutional and common law privacy claims, offers a rich
opportunity to consider how claims of reproductive autonomy,
safeguarding the health of pregnant persons,10 and the privacy of
the home coalesce in reproductive self-care to reveal underlying
tensions in regulation in this area. I argue that medication
abortion in the home falls squarely within the protections of
privacy jurisprudence: First, in medication abortion the home
functions in its traditional privacy role as a zone free from thirdparty intrusion and governmental surveillance for pregnant
people accessing medication abortion. For example, medication
8. Previous scholarship has considered reproductive self-care primarily in the
context of home-birth, with an emerging scholarship addressing the constitutional
implications of self-abortion. See, e.g., Suzanne M. Alford, Is Self-Abortion a Fundamental
Right?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1011, 1029 (2003); Cohen, supra note 6; Stacey Tovino, American
Midwifery Litigation and State Legislative References for Physician-Controlled Childbirth,
11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 61 (2004); McCormick, supra note 6.
9. These categories are used in Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1443 (1992). However, many scholars have used taxonomy to
classify the complex subject of privacy law. See, e.g., JUDITH W. DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF
PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 75–77 (1997) (identifying
privacy as a cluster of rights relating to informational privacy, accessibility privacy, and
expressive privacy); Gary L. Bostwick, Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose,
Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1447, 1448 (1976); Tom Gerety,
Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 233, 236 (1977); Jerry Kang, Information
Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202–03 (1998) (defining
privacy to include three overlapping clusters of rights: physical space, choice, and flow of
personal information); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477,
489 (2006).
10. I use the term pregnant “people” instead of “women” to acknowledge that trans
men and other gender-non-conforming people may also seek abortion-related healthcare
and may have even more difficulty accessing reproductive healthcare than cis-women
seeking abortion. See, e.g., Katha Pollitt, Who Has Abortions?, NATION (Mar. 13, 2015),
https://www.thenation.com/article/who-has-abortions/.
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abortion at home protects pregnant people in violent intimate
relationships from surveillance and further violence from intimate
partners that can be triggered by pregnancy; the home protects
individuals from harassment and surveillance by anti-abortion
protesters at clinics; and the home protects those with
compromised immigration status from state surveillance at
immigration checkpoints along the southern border of the United
States when travelling long distances to access abortion-related
healthcare at clinics. Second, the doctor requirement in
medication abortion infringes on privacy as a right related to
intimacy and autonomy of reproductive decision-making that the
Court has recognized at the core of the Fourteenth Amendment.11
Finally, medication abortion at home is encompassed by privacy’s
protection of intimate association as abortion at home allows
pregnant people to end their own pregnancies in the privacy of
their homes with the support of their chosen company, or alone,
rather than in a clinical setting. I conclude that restrictions on
reproductive self-care in the home are incongruous with privacy
law’s traditional articulation in both common law and
constitutional law.
Next, I consider more generally whether privacy is an
adequate legal framework to identify the interests involved in
restrictions on medication abortion at home. While medication
abortion at home falls within privacy’s framework of zonal,
relational, and decisional privacy,12 I draw upon critical and
feminist legal scholarship to argue that the harms imposed on
pregnant people ending their pregnancies at home are not
adequately captured or conceptualized by privacy's conceptual
framework of individuals exercising rights in the privacy of the
home. The Court’s privacy analysis that identifies the home as a
critical zone of protection against state surveillance and intrusion
fails to acknowledge the ways in which medication abortion at
home implicates private violence, third party harassment and
surveillance, and state-sponsored surveillance and regulation in
the lives of pregnant people. What is more, the privacy analysis
11. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“Our law affords
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. . . . These matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.” (citations omitted)).
12. Thomas, supra note 9, at 1443.
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fails to consider the ways in which state policies that deny access
to abortion-related healthcare create the conditions under which
pregnant people turn to medication abortion in the home, due to
clinic closures, immigration enforcement, intimate partner
violence, and harassment at clinics, to name only a few. This is
especially true for pregnant people who are living in poverty,13 of
color,14 or with compromised immigration status15 because
pregnancies for these vulnerable groups are disproportionately
subjected to surveillance.16 In short, the doctor requirement
13. While the rate of unintended pregnancies and abortion has declined among
people with resources and college graduates, it has increased among people living in
poverty and with less education. Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Disparities in
Rates of Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, 1994 and 2001, 38 PERSP. ON SEXUAL
REPROD. HEALTH 90–96 (2006); see also id. at 93 tbl. 1. As a result, those with the least
resources bear a disproportionate burden of unintended pregnancies and abortion. Allan
Rosenfield, Foreword, in MANAGEMENT OF UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, supra note 3, at
x.
14. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE,
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 18 (2d ed. 2000) (describing a
“matrix of domination” to refer to the way intersection systems of oppression function to
discipline the lives of marginalized and oppressed populations); see also Kimberlé W.
Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1449
(2012) (“The interplay between structures and identities are key elements in
understanding the ways that [women of color] are situated within and affected by the
various systems of social control.”). A rich body of scholarship has highlighted the
intersection of reproductive oppression and racial control in a variety of contexts including
forced sterilization, family caps on public support, lack of access to culturally sensitive birth
control, and criminalizing women for negative birth and pregnancy outcomes. See, e.g.,
DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE REPRODUCTION AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY 250–254 (1997); SILLMAN ET AL., UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF
COLOR ORGANIZE FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 127 (2004); Elena R. Gutiérrez, Issue
Brief, Bringing Families Out of ‘Cap’tivity: The Need To Repeal the Calworks Maximum
Family Grant Rule, CTR. ON REPROD. RTS. & JUST (April 2013)., https://www.law
.berkeley.edu/files/bccj/CRRJ_Issue_Brief_MFG_Rule_FINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 11,
2017); Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151,
152–154 (2006). By contrast, wealthier women’s pregnancies are less likely to be subject to
surveillance, as they rely on private physicians, midwives and home care.
15. See infra notes 103–08 and accompanying text.
16. See Brief for National Asian Pacific American Women’s Forum (NAPAWF) and
Center for Reproductive Rights and Justice at the University of California, Berkeley
School of Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Patel v. State, No. 71A041504-CR-00166 (Ind. Ct. App. filed Oct. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Patel Amicus Brief]; see also
KHIARA M. BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREGNANCY AS A
SITE OF RACIALIZATION 41–73 (2011); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE
COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 25–46 ( 2002) [hereinafter CHILD WELFARE] (discussing the
impact of state surveillance on communities of color); Dorothy Roberts & Jeffrey Vagle,
Opinion, Racial Surveillance Has a Long History, HILL (Jan. 4, 2016), http://thehill.
com/opinion/op-ed/264710-racial-surveillance-has-a-long-history (noting that wideranging welfare surveillance disproportionately strips recipients of color’s dignity and
privacy).
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reveals how a myriad of political, structural, and economic forces
work in tandem to deny the right of privacy in its traditional sense
to pregnant people exercising reproductive self-care in the home.
Thus, while the doctor requirement falls within privacy’s
framework, it simultaneously reveals how insubstantial the
privacy analysis is in articulating the interests at stake with respect
to the right of dignity and autonomy of pregnant people seeking
to exercise abortion-related self-care in the home.
It is a critical time to consider doctor-requirement
restrictions on medication abortion as these laws are gaining
momentum. In the last four years, nineteen states have passed
laws requiring that the two-pill regimen for medication abortion
be taken in the presence of a doctor,17 despite guidelines by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA),18 the American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), and the World
Health Organization (WHO), which do not require that either of
the pills be ingested in a doctor’s presence.19 The doctor
requirement restricts pregnant people’s ability to engage in
abortion-related self-care in the privacy of their homes and
effectively prohibits the use of telemedicine for abortion care.20
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the twopill medication abortion regimen and its uses both within and
outside of the clinical context. This section details state law
restrictions on at-home use of medication abortion and their
impact on the widespread practice of using telemedicine to deliver
abortion-related healthcare to people living in areas without

17. Telemedicine Introductory Brief: Provision of Medication Abortion, IBIS
REPROD. HEALTH (Jan. 2016), https://www.ibisreproductivehealth.org/sites/default/files/
files/publications/Telemedicine%20introductory%20brief%20Jan%202016.pdf.
18. The new FDA guidelines require that the first drug, mifepristone, be “dispensed”
by a doctor, but does not require that the pills be ingested in the presence of a doctor.
Because the guidelines do not require that either drug, mifepristone or misoprostol, be
taken in the presence of a doctor, they can be taken at home. ACOG PRACTICE BULLETIN,
supra note 3, at 2.
19. See MANAGEMENT OF UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, supra note 3; WORLD
HEALTH ORG., SAFE ABORTION: TECHNICAL AND POLICY GUIDANCE FOR HEALTH
SYSTEMS 44 (2d. ed. 2012) [hereinafter SAFE ABORTION] (“Home use of misoprostol is a
safe option for women.”); ACOG PRACTICE BULLETIN, supra note 3, at 2.
20. Telemedicine is a method of providing abortion care at a distance using
technology. The doctor requirement restricts the use of telemedicine both for home based
and clinic based telemedicine abortion care. See infra notes 33–37 and accompanying text.
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access to clinics, especially rural areas.21 It considers the claims
that these restrictions are designed to protect women’s health in
light of the undue burden standard of Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,22 and its recent articulation in
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.23 Part II argues that state
restrictions on medication abortion are unconstitutional because
medication abortion at home falls within the purview of privacy
law’s traditional protection of zonal, relational, and decisional
privacy. It concludes that the privacy interest at stake in
medication abortion at home involves matters of personal
significance related to procreation, within the physical confines of
the home, as well as the right to exercise control over one’s body
that go beyond mere location of the medical procedure in a
healthcare setting. Part III critiques the limitations of the privacy
analysis in the context of medication abortion at home and
considers how larger systems and structures deny access to
privacy for pregnant people seeking to exercise reproductive selfcare in the home.
I. THE HOME AND REPRODUCTIVE SELF-CARE
Medication abortion involves the use of medication rather
than surgery to induce an abortion.24 A pregnant person may end
a pregnancy at home using medication abortion under two
circumstances: within the clinical context facilitated by a doctor
or outside of the clinical context by self-inducing abortion. This
section details the ways that medication abortion is used to end
pregnancy both inside and outside of the clinical setting. In each
of these instances, some part of the medication abortion regimen
occurs at home.
A. MEDICATION ABORTION AND THE HOME
Medication abortion is commonplace in the United States
through medical facilities.25 In this clinical context, a pregnant
21. R.J. Gomperts et al., Using Telemedicine for Termination of Pregnancy with
Mifepristone and Misoprostol in Settings Where There Is No Access to Safe Services, 115
INT’L J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1171, 1173 (2008).
22. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
23. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
24. See, e.g., ACOG PRACTICE BULLETIN, supra note 3, at 1.
25. Gomperts et al., supra note 21, at 1173; see also Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman,
Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the United States, 46 PERSP. ON SEXUAL &
REPROD. HEALTH 17, 17–27(2014).
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person takes a two-drug protocol—mifepristone and
misoprostol—approved by the FDA.26 The FDA protocol
requires that the first medication, mifepristone, be dispensed at a
clinic,27 but does not indicate where either of the two drugs must
be ingested. Studies reveal that most pregnant people who end
their pregnancies using abortion medication choose to do so at
home.28 Medication abortion using the two-drug regimen under a
doctor’s supervision is considered to be safe and effective, with a
ninety-two to ninety-five percent success rate, comparable to that
of surgical abortion.29 As I will discuss in more detail below,30
numerous studies have confirmed the safety and efficacy of the athome administration not only of the second pill, but of the entire
regimen of medication abortion through telemedicine.31 These
studies concluded that in-home administration was as safe,
effective, and as acceptable to pregnant persons as clinic
administration.32
Telemedicine33—virtual consultation with a physician by
video—has been an effective way to provide abortion-related

26. The FDA-approved regimen is detailed in the mifepristone package label.
ACOG PRACTICE BULLETIN, supra note 3, at 2. Since FDA approval, medication abortion
has been used by almost two million women in the United States to end early pregnancies,
about 200,000 a year. Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, The Next Abortion Case Is Here, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 4, 2013), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/the-next-abortion
-case-is-here/?_r=0.
27. Mifepristone must be dispensed by a licensed medical office by the terms of the
licensing agreement. See Mifeprex Prescriber’s Agreement, DANCO LABS., https://www.
fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsand
Providers/ucm111364.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2017).
28. See MANAGEMENT OF UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, supra note 3; ACOG
PRACTICE BULLETIN, supra note 3, at 3.
29. Christian Fiala & Kristina Gemsell-Danielsson, Review of Medical Abortion
Using Mifepristone in Combination with a Prostaglandin Analogue, 74 CONTRACEPTION
66, 69 (2006); Gomperts et al., supra note 21, at 1171.
30. See infra notes 65–74 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Thoai D. Ngo et al., Comparative Effectiveness, Safety, and Acceptability
of Medical Abortion at Home and in a Clinic: A Systemic Review, 89 BULLETIN WORLD
HEALTH ORG. 360, 370 (2011).
32. Id. at 360–70.
33. The doctor requirement also presumptively bans mid-level providers such as
nurse-midwives, nurse-practitioners, and physicians-assistants from administering
medication abortion, despite recommendations from WHO, the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American Public Health Association, and the
American Medical Women’s Association to increase training and use of mid-level
providers for medication abortions. Heather D. Boonstra, Medication Abortion
Restrictions Burden Women and Providers—and Threaten U.S. Trend Toward Very Early
Abortion, 19 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 1 (2013).
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healthcare to pregnant people in rural areas.34 When telemedicine
is used in a clinical setting, a doctor talks with patients on-screen,
reviews test results, and then the doctor dispenses the dosage of
the pills remotely.35 The pills are dispensed in the clinic and the
patient takes the pills at home.36 A current study underway is
examining the effectiveness of providing abortion medication by
mail using telemedicine, thereby entirely foregoing the need for a
clinic visit.37
When pregnant people end their own pregnancies using
medication without medical supervision, they generally take
misoprostol alone.38 Gynuity Health Projects and WHO have
developed guidelines for self-induction using misoprostol alone.39
This single medication method can safely induce an abortion and
is eighty-five percent effective.40 The side effects of using the onedrug regimen of misoprostol on its own are generally minimal and
are similar to those associated with spontaneous miscarriage.41
Much research has pointed to the safety and efficacy of the singledrug regimen for medication abortion using misoprostol.42

34. Gomperts et al., supra note 21, at 1173. Telemedicine has been an effective way
to provide abortion-related healthcare to rural women as evidenced by Planned
Parenthood in Iowa’s successful program to use videoconferencing to provide abortion
medications to more than 6,500 women in rural clinics. See Emily Bazelon, The Dawn of
the Post-Clinic Abortion, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 28, 2014), https://www.nytimes.
com/2014/08/31/magazine/the-dawn-of-the-post-clinic-abortion.html.
35. Bazelon, supra note 34.
36. Id.
37. After consulting with an abortion provider by videoconference, the patient is sent
the necessary abortion medication by overnight mail. See TelAbortion Study FAQ,
TELABORTION, http://telabortion.org/faq/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2017).
38. The self-induction regimen is a one-pill regimen because mifepristone is
expensive and must be distributed at a licensed medical office. See Mifeprex Prescriber’s
Agreement, supra note 27. This protocol is often referred to as “miso-alone.” See, e.g., SAFE
ABORTION, supra note 19, at 45.
39. Instructions for Use, GYNUITY HEALTH PROJECTS, http://gynuity.org/down
loads/clinguide_ifu_pphprevention_en.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2017); see also SAFE
ABORTION, supra note 19, at 44.
40. See R. Kulier et al., Medical Methods for First Trimester Abortion, 2011
COCHRANE DATABASE SYS. REVS. at 11.
41. Id.
42. Helena von Hertzen et al., World Health Org. Res. Grp. on Postovulatory
Methods of Fertility Regulation, Efficacy of Two Intervals and Two Routes of
Administration of Misoprostol for Terminating Pregnancy: A Randomized Controlled
Equivalence Trial, 396 LANCET 1938, 1938–46 (2007); N.L. Moreno-Ruiz et al., Alternatives
to Mifepristone for Early Medical Abortion, 96 INT’L J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 212,
216–18 (2007); Consensus Statement: Instructions for Use – Abortion Induction with
Misoprostol in Pregnancy Up to 9 Weeks LMP, Expert Meeting on Misoprostol Sponsored
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Research conducted under the auspices of WHO examined the
prospect of permitting women to self-administer misoprostol
rather than requiring a doctor visit and recommended the use of
misoprostol alone in those settings where mifepristone is not
available.43
The home is central in all three contexts in which a pregnant
person may choose to end a pregnancy using medication abortion:
clinical supervision, telemedicine, and self-induction. Despite the
proven safety, efficacy, and prevalence of at-home administration
of medication abortion—both within and outside of the formal
healthcare system—in the United States there is increasing
pressure by anti-abortion groups to limit access to medication
abortion within the formal healthcare context. The next section
will examine restrictions on medication abortion through doctor
requirements which also result in prohibitions on the use of
telemedicine.
B. RESTRICTIONS ON HOME-USE OF MEDICATION ABORTION
In the last four years, nineteen states have passed legislation
that requires pregnant people who take medication abortion to
have both pills dispensed in the physical presence of a doctor.44
This doctor requirement is contrary to FDA, ACOG and WHO
protocols which provide that only the first pill, mifepristone, be
dispensed by a medical facility.45 Laws that require the physical
presence of the physician also preemptively ban the use of
telemedicine.46 In states with a doctor requirement, a pregnant
person seeking a medication abortion may have to travel long
distance to visit a clinic attended by a physician, and attend inperson counseling or undergo enforced ultrasound examinations
that necessitate multiple trips to the clinic. These laws require
pregnant persons to complete every step of the procedure in the
physical presence of a physician, rather than in the privacy of the

by Reproductive Health Technologies Project and Gynuity Health Projects, July 28, 2003,
Washington, D.C.
43. Gomperts et al., supra note 21, at 1174.
44. IBIS REPROD. HEALTH, supra note 17.
45. See MANAGEMENT OF UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, supra note 3, at 114; ACOG
PRACTICE BULLETIN, supra note 3, at 2.
46. Francine Coeytaux & Victoria Nichols, Plan C: The Safe Strategy for a Missed
Period When You Don’t Want To Be Pregnant, REWIRE (Feb. 7, 2014), https://rewire.
news/article/2014/02/07/plan-c-safe-strategy-missed-period-dont-want-pregnant/.
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home pursuant to approved guidelines.47 Justice Sotomayor
highlighted this element of the issue of medication abortion
during her questioning at recent oral arguments in Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt:
Justice Sotomayor: The medical abortion, that doesn’t
involve any hospital procedure. A doctor prescribes two
pills, and the women take the pills at home, correct?
Ms. Toti: Under Texas law, she must take them at the
facility, but that’s otherwise correct.
Justice Sotomayor: I’m sorry. What? She has to come
back two separate days to take them?
Ms. Toti: That’s correct, yes.
Justice Sotomayor: All right. So now, from when she
could take it at home, now she has to travel 200 miles or
pay for a hotel to get these two days of treatment?48
These state laws that require abortion medications be
dispensed in a healthcare setting contravene FDA labelling and
ACOG protocols for medication abortion.49 These regulations
also necessarily infringe on the right to exercise abortion-related
self-care in the home by forcing pregnant people out of the home
and into public healthcare settings. Justice Sotomayor’s
questioning also highlighted that these requirements restrict
access to abortion-related healthcare by adding difficulty, cost,
distance, and time required to access a procedure that could
otherwise be obtained after one visit—either virtual by
telemedicine or in-person—to a healthcare provider. The next
section will examine whether the added cost and difficulty of
accessing medication abortion imposed by the doctor
requirement creates an undue burden on abortion under Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey50 and Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.51
47. See MANAGEMENT OF UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, supra note 3, at 114; ACOG
PRACTICE BULLETIN, supra note 3.
48. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20–21, Whole Woman’s Health et al. v.
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274).
49. See MANAGEMENT OF UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, supra note 3; ACOG
PRACTICE BULLETIN, supra note 3.
50. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
51. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
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C. THE DOCTOR REQUIREMENT AND THE UNDUE BURDEN
STANDARD
The Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey52 held that the right of abortion
encompasses a woman’s right to have an abortion before viability
“without undue interference from the State.”53 The state may
express its interest in potential life by regulating abortion, so long
as those regulations do not pose an “undue burden” on a woman’s
ability to seek an abortion before viability.54 The undue burden
standard was defined as “a state regulation [that] has the purpose
or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”55 While the state may
seek to ensure that a woman’s choice is informed and protect the
health and safety of a woman, the state may not prohibit the
woman from making the ultimate decision to undergo an
abortion.56 This “undue burden” standard downgraded the
standard for judicial review from the strict scrutiny that had been
applied by the courts in previous abortion cases based on the view
that abortion was a fundamental right.57 Opponents of the
abortion right argued that the standard was little more than
rational basis review.58
In 2015 the Supreme Court clarified the undue burden
standard in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.59 In that case,
the Court considered a Texas law, H.B. 2, that required abortion
providers to secure admitting privileges at nearby hospitals and
required that abortion clinics meet the requirements of
52. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
53. Id. at 846.
54. Id. at 874.
55. Id. at 877.
56. Id. at 878–79.
57. See MURRAY & LUKER, supra note 4, at 775–76 (explaining that the undue
burden standard replaced the strict scrutiny standard and was originally proposed by
Justice O’Connor in her dissent in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)).
58. See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole Woman Makes:
Protection for the Abortion Right After Whole Woman’s Health, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM
149, 152 (2016), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-difference-a-whole-womanmakes (describing how the “undue burden” standard in the recent decision provided more
than mere rational basis deference, but rather that the Court “balance[d] benefits and
burdens [to] call into question myriad health-justified restrictions on abortion”); see, e.g.,
Brief for Respondents at 21–23, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292
(2016) (No. 15-274).
59. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
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ambulatory surgical centers.60 The Court required that states offer
an evidentiary basis to substantiate its claim that abortion
restrictions protected women’s health.61 Under the new analysis,
it is the role of the courts to interrogate the veracity of healthcare
claims underlying abortion restrictions. Next, the courts must
balance the purported health benefits of an abortion regulation
against the burdens placed upon women’s access to abortionrelated healthcare.62 The Court found a “virtual absence of any
health benefit”63 from the Texas law and detailed the law’s
detrimental effect on women’s access to abortion-related
healthcare.64
Medication abortion using the two-drug regimen under a
doctor’s supervision is considered to be safe and effective.65
Studies have confirmed the safety and efficacy of the at-home
administration not only of the second pill, but of the entire
regimen of medication abortion through telemedicine.66 These
studies concluded that in-home administration was as safe,
effective and as acceptable to pregnant persons as clinic
administration.67 ACOG reviewed the medical literature on athome medication abortion and concluded that pregnant persons
can “safely and effectively” use telemedicine to have medication
abortion at home.68 An analysis of pooled data from nine studies
conducted by WHO found home-based medication abortions to
be as effective as those administered in clinics, noting that “homebased medication abortions may have several advantages over
clinic-based protocols, including allowing for greater privacy and
lessening the burden on both women and service providers by
reducing the number of clinic visits.”69

60. See Act of July 12, 2013, ch. 1, §§ 1-12, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4795-4802 (West)
(codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.0031, 171.041-048, 171.061-064,
245.010-011 (West 2015) and TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 164.052, 055 (West 2015)).
61. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2310.
62. Id. at 2309 (stating that Casey “requires that courts consider the burdens a law
imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer”).
63. Id. at 2313.
64. Id. at 2311–12, 2315.
65. Fiala & Gemsell-Danielsson, supra note 29.
66. Ngo et al., supra note 31.
67. Id.
68. Bazelon, supra note 34.
69. Medication Abortion May Be Equally Safe Whether Done at Home or Clinic, 37
INT’L PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 160 (2011). In light of its safety and
efficacy, some researchers are calling for miso-alone to be available over-the-counter and
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Research has revealed that self-induced abortion using the
single-drug regimen for medication abortion using misoprostol is
safe and effective.70 WHO examined the safety of selfadministered medication abortion using misoprostol alone, as
opposed to the two-drug regimen that requires a doctor visit, and
recommended the use of misoprostol alone in those settings
where mifepristone is not available.71 The WHO safe abortion
guidelines provide that misoprostol can be used alone to safely
end a pregnancy through twelve weeks after the first day of the
last menstrual period.72 Medication abortion via telemedicine has
also been studied and found to be safe and effective. WHO
reviewed the medical literature and concluded that pregnant
persons “can safely and effectively” use telemedicine to have an
abortion, including taking misoprostol at home.73 Despite the
consistent findings of safety and efficacy of telemedicine,
Arkansas and Idaho have recently adopted new restrictions on
telemedicine for medication abortion, joining sixteen other states
in barring use of telemedicine for abortion-related healthcare.74
Further, the Whole Woman’s Health decision is significant
because it calls into question onerous health regulations that
single out abortion for regulation that do not apply to other
procedures that pose much greater risk. The Whole Woman’s
Health Court found that health care claims asserted in H.B. 2 were
called into question when the state did not similarly regulate more
dangerous procedures, such as colonoscopy, liposuction, and
childbirth.75 Similarly, the doctor requirement in medication
have suggested calling it “Plan C” in reference to the morning-after pill, RU486, that is
sold under the name “Plan B.” See Coeytaux & Nichols, supra note 46.
70. See, e.g., von Hertzen et al., supra note 42; Moreno-Ruiz et al., supra note 42;
Consensus Statement, supra note 42.
71. Coeytaux & Nichols, supra note 46, at 2 (noting that pregnant people throughout
much of the world ingest misoprostol to end pregnancies without medical supervision).
Misoprostol is readily available over the counter elsewhere in the world and is commonly
used to induce abortion outside of clinical settings. Id. Indeed, in an effort to reduce the
number of deaths due to illegal abortions throughout much of Latin America, Africa, Asia
and the Persian Gulf, WHO recently put mifepristone and misoprostol on its Essential
Medicines List. Gomperts et al., supra note 21, at 1171.
72. Coeytaux & Nichols, supra note 46; Bela Ganatra et al., From Concept to
Measurement: Operationalizing WHO’s Definition of Unsafe Abortion, 92 BULLETIN
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 153, 155 (2014).
73. Ngo et al., supra note 31; see also Gomperts et al., supra note 21.
74. IBIS, supra note 17.
75. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2315 (2016). Indeed, in
her concurrence, Justice Ginsberg stated that, “Given those realities, it is beyond rational
belief that H.B. 2 could genuinely protect the health of women, and certain that the law
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abortion singles out abortion at home for regulation at the same
time that other types of self-care at home are being expanded in
an effort to lower healthcare costs. For example, Medicare is now
taking steps to make it easier for people to do their own kidney
dialysis at home.76 Not only does at-home use save money, but
federal Medicare authorities as well as doctors recognize that
patients do better when they are active participants in their own
care, while at the same time improving patient’s experience and
lowering medical costs.77
Like other forms of home-based care such as dialysis,
medication abortion significantly lowers the cost and difficulty of
accessing abortion. For this reason, anti-abortion groups are
particularly focused on restricting the use of medication abortion.
The doctor requirement’s mandate that the medication abortion
regimen must be performed in the physical presence of a doctor
infringes upon a pregnant person’s ability to engage in
reproductive self-care in the privacy of the home, without any
cognizable health care benefits, thus calling into question the
claim that these restrictions seek to protect women’s health. What
is more, like H.B. 2 in Whole Woman’s Health, it is clear that the
doctor requirement is motivated by opposition to abortion rather
than by concern for protecting women’s health. As scholar and
journalist Linda Greenhouse summed it up, “if you think about it,
it’s evident why opponents of abortion have begun to focus on the
early nonsurgical procedure. Medical abortion is the ultimate in
women’s reproductive empowerment and personal privacy.”78
At least two courts have overturned doctor requirement
restrictions based on the undue burden analysis because of lack of
purported healthcare benefits for requiring that pregnant people
be in a doctor’s physical presence to end their own pregnancies.
The Ninth Circuit, in McCormack v. Herzog,79 held that an Idaho
provision that required that all second trimester abortions be
performed in a hospital violated the rights of women who wished
to obtain pre-viability abortions from a physician prescribing
‘would simply make it more difficult for them to obtain abortions.’” Id. at 2321 (quoting
Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2015)).
76. Eric Whitney, Feds Say More People Should Try Dialysis at Home, NPR NEWS
(Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/10/04/492932675/feds-saymore-people-should-try-dialysis-at-home.
77. Id.
78. Greenhouse, supra note 26.
79. 788 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2015).
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FDA-approved medication abortions.80 Jeanne McCormack
chose to end her own pregnancy using misoprostol that she
obtained online, because there were no licensed abortion
providers in southeastern Idaho where she lived and the nearest
abortion clinic in Salt Lake City would cost between four hundred
and two thousand dollars.81 She obtained the pills online for two
hundred dollars and successfully ended her own pregnancy at
home.82 Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court in Planned
Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Board of Medicine,
struck down a regulation banning the use of telemedicine for
medication abortion, arguing that the imposition posed an undue
burden on women’s access to abortion without sufficient evidence
that it protected women’s health.83 The case involved a program
set up by Planned Parenthood in Iowa in 2008 that used
videoconferencing to provide abortion medications to more than
6,500 pregnant people in rural clinics.84 In 2010, the Iowa Medical
Board conducted a study of the program and found that the
telemedicine program was safe and met the prevailing standard of
care.85 Despite these findings, the Iowa Right to Life organization
put pressure on Governor Terry Brandstad, who then replaced
the board. The new board voted to halt telemedicine for abortions
in Iowa.86
II. MEDICATION ABORTION AS ZONAL, RELATIONAL,
AND DECISIONAL PRIVACY
This section considers the extent to which medication
abortion at home falls within privacy’s traditional framework of
zonal, relational, and decisional privacy. First, this section argues
that medication abortion at home falls within the right of privacy
80. Id. at 1029–30.
81. Id. at 1022 n.3.
82. Id.
83. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 865 N.W.2d 252,
269 (Iowa 2015).
84. Bazelon, supra note 34; Eric Wicklund, Abortion-by-Telemedicine Pilot
Launches in Four States, MHEALTH INTELLIGENCE (Apr. 1, 2016), http://mhealth
intelligence.com/news/abortion-by-telemedicine-pilot-launches-in-4-states.
85. Daniel Grossman et al., Effectiveness and Acceptability of Medical Abortion
Provided Through Telemedicine, 118 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 295, 296–303 (2011)
[hereinafter Grossman, Telemedicine] (finding that abortion via telemedicine was safe and
effective with comparable clinical outcomes to face-to-face provision of medication
abortion and a very high patient satisfaction rate).
86. Id.
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of the home as a physical zone free from governmental
surveillance and third party intrusion. I highlight that the
Constitution protects against government intrusions into the
home and the common law protects individuals against invasions
into the solitude and repose in their home by third parties who are
not governmental actors. In both contexts—surveillance by
governmental actors and intrusion by non-governmental actors—
the Supreme Court affords heightened protection of the home
against surveillance and the home acts as a refuge that protects
the right to be let alone. Second, this section argues that the
nature of the privacy right in medication abortion at home falls
within privacy as a substantive right related to decisional
autonomy. Finally, it argues that self-induced abortion at home,
whether inside or outside of medical supervision, represents
privacy of intimate association that engages important notions of
dignity and autonomy that take place in the context of intimate
relationships.
A. MEDICATION ABORTION AND ZONAL PRIVACY
WITHIN THE HOME
The home has long served an important role in the Supreme
Court’s privacy analysis in both common law and constitutional
law. As early as colonial times there existed a strong principle that
a “man’s house is his castle; and while he is quiet, he is well
guarded as a prince in his castle.”87 Both constitutional law and
common law delineate the home as privileged space for
heightened privacy protection.88 The constitutional right of
privacy that identifies the home as a physical zone free from
governmental intrusion can be found in the Third Amendment
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers in the home;89
87. Paxton’s Case of the Writ of Assistance, in JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF
CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE
PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 51 (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co., 1865); see also Seymayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1605) (“[T]he
house of every one is to him as his . . . castle and fortress.”); Note, The Right to Privacy in
Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892, 1894 (1981).
88. See e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (describing the
“fundamental right” to be free from governmental intrusions into the privacy of the
bedroom); see also Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (arguing that
the mailbox fit within the zone of privacy of repose within the home).
89. The Third Amendment provides: “No soldier shall, in times of peace, be
quartered in any house, without consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner
to be prescribed by law.” U.S. CONST. amend. III.
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however, it is the Fourth Amendment that guarantees the most
extensive privacy rights against governmental intrusion into the
home.90 With respect to the protection against surveillance, the
Supreme Court has stated that “[w]e have said that the Fourth
Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance of the house.’”91
This zonal paradigm of privacy protects against third party and
governmental surveillance into “the sanctity of a man’s home and
the privacies of life.”92 In Stanley v. Georgia, Justice Marshall
described the “fundamental right” to be free from governmental
intrusions into the privacy of the bedroom.93 Louis Brandeis has
argued that both the common law right of privacy in tort regarding
the flow of information, and the Fourth Amendment right of
privacy of physical space, flow from the same source: “the right to
be let alone.”94
Medication abortion in the home, both self-induced and
under a doctor’s supervision, falls squarely within privacy law’s
traditional framework of zonal privacy. The home offers
enhanced privacy protection from third-party intrusion and
governmental surveillance for pregnant people accessing
medication abortion. This is especially true for pregnant people
who are living in poverty, of color,95 and with compromised
immigration status, because pregnancies for these vulnerable
groups are disproportionately subjected to surveillance through
public health insurance, public support agencies, and immigration
check-points.96 Much scholarship has explored the intersection of
reproductive rights and state surveillance of communities of

90. The Fourth Amendment provides, in part, for “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Privacy in the context of constitutional law first
appeared in cases involving the Fourth Amendment. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298, 304 (1921); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
91. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 590 (1980)) (holding that the police could not use thermal imaging to detect heat
patterns emanating from the defendant’s house because even though the surveillance was
conducted outside the defendant’s home, the thermal-imaging device was gathering
information about activities within the home); see also Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth
Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 144 (2002).
92. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
93. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
94. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 90 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY
ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
95. Patel Amicus Brief, supra note 16, at 15, 22.
96. See generally BRIDGES, supra note 16.
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color.97 For these communities subjected to heightened
surveillance, the ability to engage in abortion-related self-care in
the home offers a sanctuary against governmental surveillance.
Restrictions on medication abortion, both as self-induction
through misoprostol alone and restrictions on ingesting
medication at home under doctor supervision, increase the
scrutiny of pregnant people, including those suffering poor
pregnancy outcomes unrelated to the use of medication
abortion.98 As I will describe below, the repercussions of such
surveillance and policing will disproportionately impact
immigrant
communities,
low-income
individuals,
and
communities of color.99
Immigrant communities, communities living in poverty, and
communities of color who disproportionately live in poverty due
to barriers resulting from historic discrimination and lack of
economic opportunity100 are under greater scrutiny by police and
governmental agencies, making them more likely to have their
pregnancies subject to surveillance.101 This heightened scrutiny
results from a greater likelihood that people living in poverty and
people of color will be under governmental surveillance as the
result of receiving public assistance, being supervised by parole
officers, and under the care of public health systems.102 For
pregnant people in these communities, abortion self-induction in
the home offers greater protection from governmental
surveillance that particularly targets communities of color living
97. See, e.g., id. at 41–71; see also CHILD WELFARE, supra note 16, at 25–46;
ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 294–312; Roberts & Vagle, supra note 16.
98. People who live in poverty are more likely to suffer poor pregnancy outcomes
due to socioeconomic factors and systemic problems. Patel Amicus Brief, supra note 16 at
20; see also Lynn Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant
Women in the United States (1973-2005): The Implications for Women’s Legal Status and
Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL’Y & L. 299, 310–12 (2013) (discussing the criminalization
of women for negative birth or pregnancy outcomes and the connection between poverty
and negative birth outcomes).
99. See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 14; SILLIMAN ET AL., supra note 14; Gutiérrez,
supra note 14; Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 98; Smith, supra note 14.
100. See, e.g., Christine Dehlendorf et al., Disparities in Abortion Rates: A Public
Health Approach, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1772, 1773 (2013) (“Classifications of race,
ethnicity, and [social economic status] . . . reflect larger systems of structural inequality,
including racism and systematic inequalities in both opportunities and power.”).
101. BRIDGES, supra note 16; ROBERTS, supra note 14; CHILD WELFARE, supra note
16; Roberts & Vagle, supra note 16.
102. See, e.g., Patel Amicus Brief, supra note 16, at 27; BRIDGES, supra note 16;
ROBERTS, supra note 14; CHILD WELFARE, supra note 16; Paltrow & Flavin, supra note
98; Roberts & Vagle, supra note 16.
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in poverty. What is more, lack of abortion clinic access, lack of
health insurance coverage for abortion-related healthcare, and
lack of resources to pay out of pocket for clinic-based care push
people living in poverty towards medication abortion selfinduction, because it is less expensive and more accessible than
clinic-based care.
The role of the home as shield against governmental
surveillance is critical in the context of medication self-induction
abortion for pregnant people who are undocumented.103 Pregnant
people with compromised immigration status often turn to
medication self-induction outside of the formal healthcare system
because their ability to travel long distances to obtain
reproductive healthcare is limited by the threat of apprehension,
detention, and deportation, which severely restricts their travel
and movement.104 There has been an increase in immigration
enforcement in the last ten years, which has resulted in a dramatic
rise in detentions and deportations as well as increased policing of
communities along the southern border of the United States.105
For these pregnant people, the best choice for accessing abortion
is often by obtaining medication from one of the border mercados
or at a pharmacy across the border in Mexico where misoprostol
is sold over the counter without a prescription.106 At-home
abortion for these pregnant people allows them to end their own
103. See COLLINS, supra note 14, at 18 (describing a “matrix of domination” to refer
to the way intersection systems of oppression function to discipline the lives of
marginalized and oppressed populations); see also ROBERTS, supra note 14; SILLIMAN,
supra note 14; Crenshaw, supra note 14, at 1449 (“The interplay between structures and
identities are key elements in understanding the ways that [women of color] are situated
within and affected by the various systems of social control.”); Gutiérrez, supra note 14;
Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 98.
104. See Madeline M. Gomez, Intersection at the Border: Immigration Enforcement,
Reproductive Oppression, and the Policing of Latina Bodies in the Rio Grande Valley, 30
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 84, 86 (2015) (noting that the intersection of immigration
enforcement and reproductive oppression results in acute lack of access to reproductive
healthcare for women who lack legal immigration status).
105. Id. at 91–92; see also Ana Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S.
Deportations of Immigrants Reach Record High in 2013, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 2, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/02/u-s-deportations-of-immigrants-reachrecord-high-in-2013/.
106. See Daniel Grossman et al., Knowledge, Opinion and Experience Related to
Abortion Self-Induction in Texas, TEX. POL’Y EVALUATION PROJECT, at 1 (Nov. 17, 2015)
[hereinafter TexPEP Policy Brief] (finding that in the wake of Texas’ passage of H.B. 2,
one of the most restrictive abortion laws in the country, there has been an increase in the
use of self-induction abortion through medication). See also Erica Hellerstein, The Rise of
the DIY Abortion in Texas, ATLANTIC (June 27, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com
/health/archive/2014/06/the-rise-of-the-diy-abortion-in-texas/373240/.
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pregnancies safely, at low cost, in the comfort of their homes, and
without the threat of detention by immigration enforcement.107 A
study published last year found that in 2013 after the Texas
legislature passed the controversial state law, H.B. 2, which
shuttered thirty of the state’s forty-eight abortion clinics,
somewhere between 100,000 and 240,000 women of reproductive
age living in Texas tried to end their pregnancy entirely on their
own, without any medical assistance.108 Against the backdrop of
immigration enforcement, the home features as a classic refuge
from state surveillance, as described in the privacy case law
related to Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections.
There is a significant privacy interest for pregnant people to
choose medication abortion at home for purposes of ensuring
privacy’s elements of secrecy, anonymity, and solitude against
intrusion by non-governmental third parties. For example, athome use of medication abortion protects pregnant people
against third party surveillance by anti-abortion activists.
Permitting an individual to take medication to end their own
pregnancy in the privacy of their home spares them the aggressive
harassment and public shaming that occurs when a pregnant
person attempts to enter an abortion facility in many cities.109 In
this way, the home serves its traditional function in privacy case
law, of shielding individuals from intrusion by third parties.
Further, new technology called “geo-fencing” has allowed antiabortion groups to use mobile phone surveillance techniques to
identify “abortion-minded women” via their cell phone’s

107.
108.
109.

Hellerstein, supra note 106.
TexPEP Policy Brief, supra note 106, at 2.
See generally DAVID S. COHEN & KRYSTEN CANNON, LIVING IN THE
CROSSHAIRS: THE UNTOLD STORIES OF ANTI-ABORTION TERRORISM (2015). For
descriptions by the Supreme Court of aggressive tactics used by anti-abortion protesters at
clinics, see McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2527 (2014) (describing protesters “who
express their moral or religious opposition to abortion through sign and chants or, in some
cases, more aggressive methods such as face-to-face confrontation”); Hill v. Colorado, 530
U.S. 703, 708 (2000) (describing demonstrations in front of abortion clinics that impeded
access to the clinics and were often confrontational and included counselors who
sometimes used strong and abusive language in face-to-face encounters); Schenck v. ProChoice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 358 (1997) (invalidating the use of
“floating buffer zones”); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772 (1994)
(upholding thirty-six-foot buffer zone around clinic entrances and driveways); see also
Brief for Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts & Planned Parenthood Federation
of America as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1, McCullen v. Coakley, 2014 WL
2882079 (2014) (No. 12-1168) (describing “thirty years of violent protests and patient
harassment” at abortion clinics including the murder of two clinic employees).
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proximity to an abortion clinic. The technology allows antiabortion groups to collect data on persons at abortion clinics and
to send anti-abortion propaganda directly to their cell phones as
they sit in abortion clinic waiting rooms.110 The technology also
has the ability to collect data from cell phones such as the names
and addresses of persons seeking abortion-related healthcare if
they have visited a clinic.111 While it is beyond the scope of this
project, it is important to note that this type of surveillance and
data collection violates individuals’ privacy over the flow of
information as a common law right against third parties in tort for
public disclosure of private facts.112 This type of surveillance by
non-governmental actors is largely unregulated and is only
possible when a pregnant person enters an abortion clinic. As
these examples highlight, the home thus serves its traditional
function as a shield that protects pregnant people accessing
abortion-related healthcare from surveillance and harassment by
anti-abortion protesters, either in person or through electronic
surveillance.
For pregnant people in abusive relationships, home-based
abortion care may offer the safety and privacy necessary to
protect them from further violence. The Supreme Court
recognized the relationship between abortion and domestic
violence in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey.113 The Casey opinion struck down Pennsylvania’s spousal
consent requirement for abortion based on the findings that such
notification would expose battered partners to further abuse.114

110. Sharona Coutts, Anti-Choice Croups Use Smartphone Surveillance to Target
“Abortion-Minded Women” During Clinic Visits, REWIRE (May 25, 2016),
https://rewire.news/article/2016/05/25/anti-choice-groups-deploy-smartphone-surveillance
-target-abortion-minded-women-clinic-visits/.
111. Id.
112. See William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). Jerry Kang has
identified this type of privacy as “an individual’s claim to control the terms under which
personal information — information identifiable to the individual — is acquired, disclosed,
and used.” Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 1205 (1998). Much scholarship has addressed concerns with this type of data
collection and the ability of individuals to control the flow of information about themselves
with respect to information technology and cyberspace. See generally FRED H. CATE,
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1997); OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC
SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION (1993); PRISCILLA M.
REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1995).
113. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
114. Id. at 892–93.
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Violence by intimate partners increases in pregnancy both in
frequency and in intensity.115 The Casey Court noted that, “[m]ere
notification of pregnancy is frequently a flashpoint for battering
and violence within the family.”116 The Casey Court concluded:
[T]he District Court’s findings reinforce what common sense
would suggest. . . . [T]here are millions of women in this country
who are the victims of regular physical and psychological abuse
at the hands of their husbands. Should these women become
pregnant, they may have very good reasons for not wishing to
inform their husbands of their decision to obtain an abortion.117

In light of the risk of violence associated with pregnancy and
abortion, it is often critical for pregnant people in abusive
relationships who seek abortions to find a way to end their own
pregnancies. Abortion self-induction mimics miscarriage and is
undetectable when the pills are taken orally.118 Clinic-based
abortion care often requires taking time off work to go to clinics,
this is especially true in those states where taking the two pills for
medication abortion requires two separate trips to the abortion

115. Beth A. Bailey, Partner Violence During Pregnancy: Prevalence, Effects,
Screening, and Management, 2 INT’L J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 183 (2010); Julie A.
Gazmararian et al., Prevalence of Violence Against Pregnant Women, 275 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 667, 672 (1996); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant
Women, 81 IND. L.J. 667, 672 (2006). Indeed, in the United States, homicide is the leading
cause of death among pregnant women. Jeani Chang et al., Homicide: A Leading Cause of
Injury Deaths Among Pregnant and Postpartum Women in the United States, 1991-1999, 95
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 471, 473 (2005). A survivor of domestic violence who is forced to
carry the pregnancy to term is less able to leave the abusive relationship because abusers
often use threats of abuse against children as a means of coercion and control and the birth
of children is more likely to make mothers economically dependent on their abusers. See
Brief for Experts and Organizations Supporting Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15–20, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136
S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274) [hereinafter Intimate Partner Violence Amicus Brief].
116. Casey, 505 U.S. at 889. As the Casey Court recognized, “Many may fear
devastating forms of psychological abuse from their husbands, including verbal
harassment, threats of future violence, the destruction of possessions, physical
confinement to the home, the withdrawal of financial support, or the disclosure of the
abortion to family and friends.” Id. at 893; see also id. at 889 (noting the district court
findings that abusive partners may “threaten to (a) publicize her intent to have an abortion
to family, friends or acquaintances; (b) retaliate against her in future child custody or
divorce proceedings; (c) inflict psychological intimidation or emotional harm upon her, her
children or other persons; (d) inflict bodily harm on other persons such as children, family
members or other loved ones; or (e) use his control over finances to deprive of necessary
monies for herself or her children”).
117. 505 U.S. at 892–93.
118. Kulier et al., supra note 40.
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clinic on two different days, often at long distance.119 When
survivors of domestic violence are required to take pills in clinics;
they run the risk of being seen entering a clinic; this is especially
true because a common aspect of the coercion and control cycle
of domestic violence involves abusive partners monitoring the
movements of their victims.120 Abortion at home may offer safety
and privacy for abused pregnant people to end their own
pregnancies without giving notice to abusive partners.
B. MEDICATION ABORTION AND PRIVACY OF
DECISIONAL AUTONOMY
Privacy’s second broad category is decisional autonomy
which has been recognized in a series of cases, from Eisenstadt v.
Baird121 to Roe v. Wade122 and its progeny. The Eisenstadt case
extended the right of unmarried people to access contraception.
The Court articulated the right by saying, “If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child.”123 In 1973 the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade recognized that the right of privacy as decisional autonomy
extended to encompass the abortion decision. There, the Court
held that, “This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass
a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.”124 Justice Stevens, in Whalen v. Roe, expressed the
119. Justice Sotomayor raised this issue during questioning at oral argument in Whole
Woman’s Health. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
120. Intimate partner violence involves coercion and control, and violence is just one
way that abusive partners use to exert control. As the amici experts in intimate partner
violence in Whole Woman’s Health explain, these tactics of coercive control also involve
isolating the abused person from family and friends and monitoring her whereabouts and
relationships by “track[ing] their use of transportation, and catalog[ing] their time spent
out of the home.” Intimate Partner Violence Amicus Brief, supra note 115, at 7–8 (citing
Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic
Violence Cases, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 2117, 2126–27 (1993); LEIGH GOODMARK, A
TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 42 (2011)).
121. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
122. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
123. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
124. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. The Court framed the decisional right as the right to decide
to terminate a pregnancy in consultation with a “responsible physician.” Id. This
conceptualization has been widely criticized for subordinating the constitutional rights of
pregnant people to the judgment of their doctors. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Doctors,
Patients and the Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis of the Physician’s Role in “Private”
Reproductive Decisions, 63 WASH. U. L. Q. 183, 197–201 (1985); Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s
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privacy right in abortion cases as an “interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions.”125
Laws that restrict at-home use of medication abortion
necessarily limit the right of pregnant people to make choices
about the care they will receive. While abortion opponents may
argue that the doctor requirement does not restrict abortion itself,
only the way that abortion-related healthcare is delivered, this
argument fails to recognize that decisions over medical care are at
the heart of decisional autonomy. For example, Justice
Blackmun’s concurring opinion in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey126 identified abortion as a
right of reproductive choice, stating: “Just as the Due Process
Clause protects the deeply personal decision of the individual to
refuse medical treatment, it also must protect the deeply personal
decision to obtain medical treatment, including a woman’s
decision to terminate a pregnancy.”127 In his concurring opinion in
Roe v. Wade, Justice Douglas argued that abortion was a right of
health that was related to privacy, describing the medical privacy
right as “the right to care for one’s health and person and to seek
out a physician of one’s own choice.”128 His concurrence identified
abortion specifically as a right of privacy related to healthcare,
rather than as a right of privacy related to procreation, marriage,
and childrearing.129 He described this right of healthcare by
stating, “The right to seek advice on one’s health and the right to
place reliance on the physician of one’s choice are basic to
Fourteenth Amendment values.”130 He argued in Roe that the
term “liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment included “the
freedom to care for one’s health and person, freedom from bodily
restraint or compulsion, freedom to walk or stroll or loaf.”131 This

Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims That Engendered Roe, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1875, 1879
(2010) (arguing that Roe v. Wade gave only “confused expression” to women as
constitutional rights holders in the abortion decision and gave greater protection to
doctors’ rights to make medical decisions than to women’s rights to control reproduction);
Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 273–79 (1992); see also Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199–1200 (1992).
125. 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977).
126. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
127. Id. at 928 n.3 (Blackmun, J. concurring).
128. Roe, 410 U.S. at 219 (Douglas, J. concurring).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 219–20.
131. Id. at 213 (emphasis omitted).
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characterization of the abortion right highlights that the ability to
make healthcare decisions about abortion, like the decision to end
one’s own pregnancy at home, is integral to the right of decisional
autonomy. Prohibitions on the use of medication abortion within
the home through the doctor requirement infringe on the liberty
and autonomy of reproductive decision-making that the Court has
recognized at the core of the Fourteenth Amendment.132
For many pregnant people, self-directed abortion care may
be an expression of values and belief systems and reflects notions
of autonomy and liberty that go beyond mere healthcare.133
Researchers have found that many pregnant people prefer
medication abortion in the privacy of their homes over clinicbased care because they view it as more natural to expel the
product of conception by miscarriage than through surgery.134
Further, many prefer medication abortion at home because it
offers greater privacy than a clinical setting.135 A review of twelve
published studies on patient attitudes and reactions to early firsttrimester pregnancy termination by medication showed
consistently that when given a choice between medication and
surgical abortion, sixty to seventy percent of patients chose the
medication method.136 The most common reasons cited for
choosing medication over surgery were greater privacy and
autonomy, less invasiveness, and greater naturalness than
surgery.137 Thus, the decision to self-induce abortion, inside or
outside of the healthcare context, may express deeply held values
and beliefs about health, nature, feminist values, or religion.138
132. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“Our law affords
constitutional protection to personal decision relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. . . . These matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.” (citations omitted)).
133. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 58, at 14.
134. Daniel Grossman et al., Self-Induction of Abortion Among Women in the United
States, in REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS 142, 142 (2010); Gomperts et al., supra note
21, at 1173; Beverly Winikoff et al., Acceptability of Medical Abortion in Early Pregnancy,
27 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPS. 142, 142–48 (1995).
135. Gomperts et al., supra note 21, at 1171; Grossman et al., supra note 134, at 142;
Winikoff et al., supra note 134, at 142–48.
136. Gomperts et al., supra note 21, at 1173 (noting that studies have shown that a
majority of women prefer at-home use of medication to clinic-based care); Grossman,
Telemedicine, supra note 85, at 296–303.
137. Id.
138. This argument has been set forth in the context of home birth but in many ways
parallels to at-home abortion. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 855 (describing that childbirth
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Medication abortion at home should be understood as more
than simply a medical decision or personal preference. The
decision to end a pregnancy at-home through use of medication
engages the very values expressed by the Casey Court in its
description of abortion as a protected part of the fundamental
right of privacy: “These matters, involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”139 The decision to
exercise reproductive autonomy within the privacy of the home
relates to bodily integrity and the right to exercise autonomy
within the sacred precinct of the home.140 Abortion self-induction
in the home involves reproductive autonomy which the Supreme
Court has deemed as a protected interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment.141 Indeed, the Court has described reproductive
autonomy as being integral to the very core of human identity.142
C. MEDICATION ABORTION AND PRIVACY
OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION
Finally, the right of privacy has been recognized to include
privacy of intimate relationships. Most notably, the decisions in
Griswold v. Connecticut143 and Lawrence v. Texas144 drew upon
the privacy case law related to protection of the physical
boundaries of the home, and extended it to emphasize that it is
not merely the physical confines of the home, but the deeply
personal activities that occur within the home, that are protected
by the right of privacy. The Griswold Court relied upon privacy
choice expresses deeply held beliefs and values); Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of
the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J. 492, 549 (1994) (“[E]fforts to employ this alternative approach
[of home birth] can be seen as acts of resistance to the dominant order, acts informed by
an alternative set of understandings of the world that medicine purports to know.”).
139. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992).
140. There is a growing recognition of the importance of self-directed care at home in
many contexts. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 121–26 and accompanying text.
142. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty
is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life.”).
143. 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a portion of a Connecticut
statute that prohibited the use of contraceptives).
144. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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cases that related to physical zones of privacy in the Third, Fourth,
and First Amendments to conclude that the guarantees in the Bill
of Rights “have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance.”145 This
substantive right of privacy overlaps with both spatial privacy of
the marital bedroom and substantive privacy in reproductive
decisions that take place within intimate relationships. The
Griswold decision addressed the intrusion into the physical
confines of the home, specifically the marital bedroom, but also
the “privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”146 The Court
stated that the case involved “a relationship lying within the zone
of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of
contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale,
seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive
impact upon that relationship.”147
The Lawrence Court, like the Griswold Court, expanded the
right of privacy of physical space within the home to include the
private activities and relationships that take place and find refuge
in the home. The Lawrence Court described the right of intimate
association as:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our
tradition, the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there
are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home,
where the State should not be a dominant presence. Freedom
extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy
of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of
the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent
dimensions.148

145.
146.
147.
148.

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
Id. at 485–86.
Id. at 485.
539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
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Thus, under the Supreme Court’s privacy analysis, the home
has become a sanctuary for the exercise of the most personal
rights related to humanity149 and dignity.150
The doctor requirement is a governmental intrusion into
intimate personal activity that makes it incongruous with privacy
of intimate association. Medication abortion at home allows a
pregnant person to end a pregnancy in the comfort of home,
surrounded by family and support of friends, rather than in a
clinical setting.151 Others may choose a medical abortion at home
because it offers privacy and solitude that is not available in a
clinical setting. Thus, it is important to recognize that privacy
interest at stake in medication abortion at home may involve
matters of personal significance related to procreation within the
context of the home as a location of intimacy and support that
goes beyond merely a location for healthcare delivery.152
III. THE DOCTOR REQUIREMENT AND THE
LIMITATIONS OF PRIVACY
While medication abortion at-home falls within privacy’s
traditional analysis as a zonal, relational, and decisional right, this
section argues that privacy is inadequate to encompass the
interests at stake in medication abortion at home. As the
foregoing discussion reveals, a myriad of economic, political, and
social forces influence a pregnant person to choose medication
abortion at home. The forces that push people toward ending
their own pregnancies at home include poverty, inaccessibility of
149. Kenneth Karst has written on the privacy right of intimate association that flows
from the First Amendment. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89
YALE L.J. 624, 692 (1980) (“The freedom to choose our intimates and to govern our dayto-day relations with them . . . is the foundation for the one responsibility among all others
that most clearly defines our humanity.”).
150. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[H]ere
we have not an intrusion into the home so much as on the life which characteristically has
its place in the home.”).
151. See Patel Amicus Brief, supra note 16, at 14; see also Grossman et al., supra note
134, at 142.
152. For the parallels between home-birth and abortion at-home, see Cohen, supra
note 6, at 868–77; McCormick, supra note 6, at 682–93. Personal empowerment and
autonomy are values that have long animated the practice of reproductive self-care in a
variety of contexts from home birth to at-home miscarriage management. See Patel
Amicus Brief, supra note 16, at 14 (citing Josee Lafrance & Lyne Mailhot, Empowerment:
A Concept Well-Suited for Midwifery, 4 CAN. J. MIDWIFERY RES. & PRAC. 2 (2005));
Yvonne Lindgren, From Rights to Dignity: Drawing Lessons from the Movements for
Aid in Dying and Reproductive Rights, 5 UTAH L. REV. 779 (2016).
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clinics and waiting periods, immigration policy, family violence,
and failure to protect against and police clinic harassment, to
name only a few. As I will describe in this section, the doctor
requirement reveals that public, private, and state-sponsored
harm are imposed on pregnant people ending their pregnancies at
home that are not adequately captured or conceptualized in
privacy’s conceptual framework of individuals exercising rights in
the privacy of the home. Identifying medication abortion at home
as a right of privacy fails to acknowledge the ways in which third
party and state actions and policies come to bear upon—and
ultimately circumscribe—the ability of individuals to make
reproductive decisions in the home. In other words, privacy law’s
traditional analysis fails to acknowledge the myriad of political,
economic, and social systems that influence and effect decisionmaking in this context.
Privacy jurisprudence reinforces a liberal notion of what has
been described as the “atomistic man,” or the conceptual
framework that views individuals as separate, atomistic
individuals competing for legal rights rather than recognizing
individuals as interconnected, dependent, and existing within a
community.153 The Court in Stanley v. Georgia described that right
of privacy in relation to the “man sitting alone in his house.”154
This idealized liberal notion of the individual embodies a
distinctively masculine perspective that fails to account for the
lived experiences of women whose lives are often marked by
interdependence, caregiving, connection, and responsibility.155 As
the preceding section highlighted, rather than “atomistic”
individuals exercising rights in the privacy of their homes,
pregnant people who choose medication abortion may be
individuals whose choices are necessarily affected by where they
are situated within social, political, and economic systems.
Poverty, immigration status, and violence in the home are but a

153. See Linda C. McClain, “Atomistic Man” Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1174–76 (1992).
154. In Stanley v. Georgia, Justice Marshall wrote, of the “fundamental right” to be
free from governmental intrusions into the privacy of the bedroom: “If the First
Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting
alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.” 394 U.S.
557, 565 (1969).
155. McClain, supra note 153, at 1174; see also CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE 87–89 (1982); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 21
(1988).
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few of the factors that may push pregnant people toward
medication abortion at home. In light of these realities, the
privacy analysis fails to recognize the ways that public forces
impact private decision-making.
A central focus of feminist theorizing has been to critique the
right of privacy, especially as it has been conceptualized as a zone
free from governmental regulation.156 The liberal conception of
the constitutional protection of personal or family privacy—often
centered within the home—fails to take into account that the
home is a realm in which women have unequal power and are
physically vulnerable.157 For example, familial privacy has
historically been used as a rationale to shield the private abuse of
domestic violence from public scrutiny and prosecution.158 Courts
and police agencies often refused to arrest and prosecute
batterers because of their reluctance to intrude upon the privacy
of the home and family.159 Thus, the private sphere of the home
free of unwanted governmental and community interference must
be understood in the context of social and sexual inequality.160 As
scholar Anita Allen has argued, the liberal conception of the
private realm free of state interference “undervalues private
inequality and overstates individual agency.”161
156. Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC
PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281, 281 (Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus eds., 1983)
(“The dichotomy between the private and the public is central to almost two centuries of
feminist writing and political struggle; it is, ultimately, what the feminist movement is
about.”); Tracey E. Higgins, Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing,
75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 847–48 (2000) (explaining that attacking the public/private line
has been one of the primary concerns of feminist theorizing for over two decades).
157. See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 119 (1994); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex
Equality Under the Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1311 (1991) (“[T]he law’s privacy is a sphere
of sanctified isolation, impunity, and unaccountability.”).
158. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 157, at 119 (“[I]f patriarchal control of women’s
choices and patriarchal domination of women’s inner and public lives occur in the very
private realm of home life[,] then the Constitution, above all else, protects the very system
of power and control that constrains us.”); MacKinnon, supra note 157, at 1318.
159. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2154–61 (1996).
160. See, e.g., ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE
SOCIETY 54–56 (1988); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v.
Wade, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 101–02 (1987); Nadine
Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women’s Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 328–55 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1990);
Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 813–23 (1999).
161. Higgins, supra note 156, at 851.
AND
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Similarly, it is critical to understand the privacy interest in
medication abortion within the context of social and sexual
inequality. Pregnant people do not come to the abortion decision
with a full range of rights and privileges. Rather, they turn towards
medication abortion because of systems of oppression, both
private, such as intimate partner violence, as well as public, in the
case of immigration surveillance, clinic harassment, and the cost
and distance involved in accessing clinic-based abortion care. The
unique burdens placed on individuals seeking to end their
pregnancies because they are living in poverty, undocumented,
living in rural areas far from an abortion clinic, or living in abusive
relationships, are not captured by the privacy analysis. Scholar
and activist Jael Silliman has described that
conception of choice is rooted in the neoliberal tradition that
locates individual rights at its core, and treats the individual’s
control over her body as central to liberty and freedom. This
emphasis on individual choice, however, obscures the social
context in which individuals make choices, and discounts the
ways in which the state regulates populations, disciplines
individual bodies, and exercises control over sexuality, gender,
and reproduction.162

Therefore, despite the fact that medication abortion technically
falls within the four corners of privacy’s doctrine, it is critical to
acknowledge the political, social, and economic forces at play in
private decision-making that takes place within the home.
Private violence, third party surveillance and harassment,
and governmental regulation all work in tandem to influence
decision-making in the context of medication abortion at home.
These structural systems and their influence on private decisionmaking are not accounted for by privacy’s analysis, which
conceptualizes the right in necessarily individualistic, isolated
terms. Professor Kendall Thomas has described the combination
162. Jael Silliman, Introduction, in POLICING THE NATIONAL BODY x–xi (Jael
Silliman & Anannya Bhattacharjee eds., 2002). The movement for reproductive justice
contextualizes decision-making to consider how lack of social support, access to
healthcare, poverty, race, disability, age and rural location, for example, affect decisionmaking. For more information on “reproductive justice,” see Reproductive Justice Virtual
Library, CTR. ON REPROD. RTS. & JUST., https://www.law.berkeley.edu/phpprograms/centers/crrj/zotero/library.php (last visited Apr. 11, 2017). See generally Silliman
et al., supra note 14; ASIAN COMMUNITIES FOR REPROD. JUSTICE, A NEW VISION FOR
ADVANCING OUR MOVEMENT FOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS,
AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE (2005); SISTERSONG WOMEN OF COLOR REPROD.
HEALTH COLLECTIVE, REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE BRIEFING BOOK (2007).
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of social interests and forces at work that bear upon constitutional
rights as “body politics” that exist beyond the narrow
conceptualization of privacy.163 He uses the term body in its
corporeal sense, as the actual harm wrought upon the physical
bodies of individuals as a result of public and private harm,
violence, and governmental complicity that is not captured by the
traditional privacy framework.164 He argues that privacy’s narrow
articulation fails to acknowledge or account for the public and
private practices that affect access to constitutional rights. He
describes that, “This constellation of prohibitive practices . . .
enlists the unauthorized, unofficial, disciplinary powers of private
actors and the authorized, official police power of state
institutions . . . . Given this complexity, the question becomes
whether the factual predicates of the issues presented in
Hardwick can be cleanly or comprehensively contained within the
constitutional category of privacy.”165
Similarly, privacy in the context of medication abortion fails
to account for the myriad of state and private forces that bear
upon decision-making and autonomy in the realm of the home.
For example, as described above, intimate partner violence may
drive some pregnant people to medication abortion at home to
avoid detection by abusive partners for ending a pregnancy.
Pregnancy is a common flashpoint for intimate partner violence
and abusers frequently restrict access to reproductive care and
contraception to coerce and control their victims.166 In this
context, the private violence of intimate partners would cast
serious doubt as to whether a pregnant person has true access to
either decisional autonomy or privacy in its traditional sense when
considering whether medication abortion at home falls within
privacy’s legal boundaries. As described in Professor Thomas’
work, it may be argued that private violence and state complicity
in violence in the home through lack of enforcement form part of
the body politic that influences decisional autonomy in the home,
but is not recognized in the narrow conscripts of the right of
163. Thomas, supra note 9, at 1435–36; see also id. at 1461–62. Professor Thomas’ work
considers the limits of the privacy analysis in Bowers v. Hardwick, arguing that the privacy
analysis fails to acknowledge the role that sodomy laws play in encouraging private
homophobic violence and governmental complicity in violence toward the LGBTQ
community.
164. Id. at 1436.
165. Id. at 1441 (emphasis added).
166. See supra notes 113–21 and accompanying text.
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privacy. Privacy fails to acknowledge the public aspect of abortion
access and fails to address the necessity of a governmental
commitment to the right. Instead, situating medication in the
home in terms of a right of privacy fails to acknowledge the ways
that economic, political, and social systems bear upon medication
abortion in the home.
In addition to intimate partner violence, the privacy analysis
also fails to account for the ways in which public actors such as
clinic protestors, and State policies that restrict access to clinics,
require waiting periods and long travel, are integral to—or should
be integral to—the privacy analysis. The doctor requirement
restricts pregnant people’s access to care in the privacy and
protection of their homes and forces them into a public setting of
a clinic. In addition to the impact on the dignity and decisional
autonomy of all pregnant people who are denied access to
medication abortion at home, the doctor requirement subjects
those who are most vulnerable to the potential of increased risk
of private violence, public harassment and surveillance, and state
surveillance and detention. Limiting the analysis to privacy of the
home limits the analysis of the public and private implications of
the doctor requirement. In short, the limited nature of the privacy
analysis fails to acknowledge the public dimensions and the
private harm of the doctor requirement.
CONCLUSION
Medication abortion at-home falls squarely within zonal,
relational, and decisional privacy. Common law privacy protects
the home as a sanctuary of solitude and repose free of intrusions
by third parties. Constitutional privacy law protects the home as
a location free of governmental surveillance and intrusion.
Further, the Court has recognized the right of privacy to
encompass more than merely spatial privacy within the physical
confines of the home. Rather, the Court has held that the privacy
right encompasses deeply personal decisions related to marriage,
child rearing, reproduction and intimacy of relationships.
Medication abortion, both inside and outside of the clinical
context, engages the right of pregnant persons to protections
against third party and governmental surveillance within the
privacy of the home as well as protection of pregnant people’s
liberty and autonomy to exercise reproductive decision-making.
In the context of medication abortion at home, the home
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functions in the traditional way set forth in privacy jurisprudence,
as a shield against state surveillance and as a location of solitude
and repose, especially for marginalized communities. People
living in poverty, in rural areas, of color, or with compromised
immigration status may be more likely to turn to self-induction
abortion outside of the formal healthcare system because of fears
of immigration surveillance, structural barriers such as cost,
distance of clinics, and waiting periods. The higher rate of
abortion self-induction among these marginalized groups leaves
them open to greater surveillance and therefore in greater need
of the protection of the home as a shield against state and third
party surveillance.
More broadly, however, analyzing medication abortion
within privacy law’s framework of zonal, decisional, and relational
privacy highlights the limitations of the privacy analysis in this
context. The Court’s conceptualization of an individualized
privacy right, or what has been described as the “atomistic man,”
fails to account for social, political, and economic forces that work
in tandem to deprive pregnant people of meaningful privacy in
the home. Much feminist scholarship has criticized privacy as a
legal concept and questioned whether privacy is a right that is
available to women. The doctor requirement suggests that privacy
continues to be elusive and largely unavailable to pregnant
people. Rather, while privacy case law has centered the home as
a zone free from governmental intrusion, for pregnant people the
home has become a site of increasing regulation in the benign
guise of protecting women’s health.

